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ARTICLES
A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of "Normal
Species Functioning" in Disability Analysis
Ani B. Satz, Ph.D., J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed into law by
President George H. W. Bush on July 26, 1990. After twenty years of struggle
and compromise by civil rights and disability advocacy groups, the legislation
was hailed as a victory. The Act established civil rights protection for disabled
persons in the workplace and in the provision of services (most notably
transportation services) and public accommodation. The Act sought to "provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities ... [via] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards."1
Fifteen years later, the Act is widely recognized as a failure. Judicial
construction of the eligibility requirements of the Act severely undermines
disability protections. In 1999, the United States Supreme Court, in opposition to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University. The author wishes to thank the Harvard
Health Policy Society; the Yale Bioethics Forum; the Princeton Center for Human Values; the
National Endowment for the Humanities Workshop on Justice, Disability, and Equality; the Health
Law Teachers Workshop; and the following individuals: Howard E. Abrams, Robert Ahdieh, Anita
Bernstein, Jules Coleman, Martha A. Fineman, Ann Hubbard, Marc Miller, Michael Perry, Mathias
Risse, Charles Shanor, Robert Schapiro, Anita Silvers. Peter Singer, Michael Stein, Timothy
Terrell, and anonymous reviewers. I offer this piece in memory of my friend, colleague, and former
law school classmate, Rosemary Quigley, who was one of the most capable people I have ever
known.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(l)-(2) (2000). See
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Department of
Justice (DOJ) guidelines at the time, held that plaintiffs' eligibility for disability
protections must be determined after measures to mitigate disability are
employed.2 The definition of disability, "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one ... of the major life activities,, 3 has met other judicial
bars With regard to the interpretation of "substantial" and "major life activity.
'A
Thousands of articles have been written in the last few years lamenting the
enervation of the ADA and suggesting remedies such as amending the Act to
broaden the definition of disability,' issuing regulations to enumerate a list of
covered disabilities,6 overruling opinions that create high bars for eligibility
under "substantial" 7 or that look to a narrow range of major life activities, 8 and
reinstating the old EEOC and DOJ guidelines to consider litigants in a pre-
mitigated state.9 Most recently, in a piece about the future of disability law,
2. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); see also Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
4. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability" Discrimination:
A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 321
(2003); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 163-64
(2000) (arguing that the ADA should prohibit discrimination on the basis of "impairment," a
broader category than "disability"); Barbara A. Lee, A Decade of the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Judicial Outcomes and Unresolved Problems, 42 INDUS. REL. 11 (2003); Steven S. Locke, The
Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 107 (1997); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the
"Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587 (1997); see
also NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA, at § II(b) (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/righting__ada.htm.
6. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How
Individualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REv. 327
(1997); Wendy E. Parmet, Individual Rights and Class Discrimination: The Fallacy of an
Individualized Determination of Disability, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 283, 301 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1997); Lisa Eichhom, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A
Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1071 (1999); Feldblum, supra note 5, at 162.
8. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 162-63; Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major
Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REv. 997 (2004); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition
of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REv. 321 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Debra Burke & Malcom Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection:
Use It and Lose It or Refuse It and Lose It? 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 785 (2001); Feldblum, supra note 5, at
VI:2 (2006)
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leading disability scholar Sam Bagenstos, perhaps out of frustration with the rigid
pronouncements that have become judicial construction of the ADA, argues that
a return to a social welfare model is necessary to provide the disabled with the
opportunities, services, and access they need.'0 Given the gradual whittling of
the Act, disability scholars and advocates were not surprised to learn some years
ago that approximately ninety-four percent of disabled plaintiffs who pursue
litigation lose in initial judicial proceedings, and eighty-four percent fail on
appeal; this is comparable to the failure rate of prisoner civil rights claims, which
is about eighty-six percent.''
Perhaps the greatest judicial threat to the Act-and the subject of this
Article-has yet to enter academic discussion. This Article examines the proper
role of normal species functioning with regard to disability analysis. It proposes
general inquiries for disability analysis and considers the Supreme Court's
application of the role of normal species functioning to each inquiry. The Court's
failure to consider properly the role of normal species functioning has profoundly
impacted American disability law by creating divergent outcomes in the
application of established Supreme Court tests and by undermining protections
for persons with disabilities. In addition, it forces reliance on conceptions of
disability that may embrace stereotypes or inaccurate assessments of abilities,
resulting in the isolation and unemployment of disabled workers Congress sought
162; Vicki J. Limas, Of One Legged Marathoners and Legally Blind Pilots: Disabling the ADA on
a Case-By-Case Basis, 35 TULSA L.J. 505, 539, 544 (2000); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and
Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 53, 55, 88 (2000); Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99
MICH. L. REV. 532, 553 (2000).
10. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004). Bagenstos
argues that the civil rights paradigm of disability discrimination should be abandoned in favor of a
return to a welfare-based model eschewed by advocates of the ADA, in order to give force to the
issues facing the disabled and to account for the withering reach of the ADA. This Article seeks to
propose a new framework for disability analysis that continues to embrace the text of the ADA and
give effect to disability protections as a matter of civil right thereunder. While it is clear that some
issues facing the disabled (and other Americans, for that matter), such as access to health care and
certain types of accommodations, are best addressed by social welfare schemes that seek
distributive justice rather than formal justice, Bagenstos errs by excising disability discrimination
from the civil rights context.
11. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999). This does not account for settlements and other informal
agreements. In addition, the fact that most plaintiffs lose their cases does not mean that the ADA is
unsuccessful in upholding a civil right but only that the right could be more robust. The ADA
serves as a statement of government that discrimination against disabled persons is a violation of
civil right and functions to discourage some acts of such discrimination. I am grateful to Charles
Shanor for this point.
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to avoid.
This Article will reference two different models of functioning: the normal
species functioning model and the alternative modes of functioning model.
Briefly stated, the normal species functioning model considers deviation from
functioning that is normal for our species to be disabling. The alternative modes
of functioning model does not look to a particular type of functioning but
assesses functional outcomes to determine whether a certain level of functioning
is disabling. For example, reading with one's eyes is normal species functioning,
while using one's fingers to read Braille is an alternative mode of functioning.
Supreme Court jurisprudence can be understood to appeal to both of these
models: Alternative functioning is considered when determining whether
someone is disabled under the ADA, and normal species functioning informs
reasonable accommodation under the Act. This Article urges the Court to
consider directly the role of functioning and to employ these two models in the
opposite fashion, adopting what this Article terms Functioning-Based Disability
Analysis. Under Functioning-Based Disability Analysis, the Court should
consider normal species functioning when deciding eligibility for protection
under the Act and alternative modes of functioning when determining reasonable
accommodation.
To help clarify the differences between the normal species functioning
model and the alternative modes of functioning model consider the following
hypothetical:
Hannah, an employee of a software development company, was born with
partial upper arms. She is able to type using upper arm prostheses, but she finds
wearing them painful and typing with them inefficient; it is also difficult to
hold the telephone or items on her desk while wearing them. She prefers to use
her "fleshy feet"'' 2 to type as well as to grasp and manipulate objects.
13
Under a normal species functioning model, Hannah is disabled because she does
not have full-length arms. She is entitled to resources and an accommodation to
further normal functioning, where "normal functioning" means typing with her
upper arms. Under an alternative modes of functioning model, Hannah is
disabled because her functioning is impaired in her work environment and not
because she is missing part of her arms. She is entitled to a remedy, and it need
not support normal functioning. Thus, her employer may offer to adapt her office
to enable her to type with her fleshy feet.
12. "Fleshy feet" distinguishes Hannah's feet from prosthetic feet. Ani B. Satz & Anita Silvers,
Disability and Biotechnology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 173, 185 (Thomas J. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000).
13. This example is adapted from one in Satz & Silvers, supra note 12, at 183.
VI:2 (2006)
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This example of Hannah and the software company, and the role of normal
species functioning in disability analysis more generally, also speaks to an
overarching tension in disability law: the tension between civil rights and social
welfare models. Generally speaking, a civil rights model grounds a right to
equality of participation for disabled persons as a protected class . 4 Under this
model, others have concomitant duties to adjust, within certain parameters,
places of employment, public accommodation, services, and transit, in order to
decrease isolation and enable greater participation of disabled persons in society.
The duties supported by this right entitle Hannah to a remedy if her rights are
violated, though they do not speak to the nature of her remedy. Accommodation
under a civil rights model need not support any particular manner of functioning,
so long as steps are taken to promote equality in the workplace. Indeed, the ADA
does not specify the manner of functioning that should be supported. In other
words, the Act, a civil rights mandate, does not require employers to
accommodate atypical modes of functioning, such as Hannah's fleshy feet. A
social welfare model, on the other hand, is redistributive. It seeks to better the
position of the disadvantaged through resource allocation.' 5 Under a social
welfare model, Hannah may be recognized as disadvantaged by her manner of
functioning and entitled to resources to facilitate typing using her feet. A social
welfare model would not, though, confer rights on Hannah based upon her
disability per" se. Under a social welfare model, she is entitled to resources
because she is disadvantaged in a particular population by the manner in which
she functions; others who are disadvantaged-whether disabled or not-have
similar entitlement. The civil rights model, by contrast, recognizes a history of
discrimination against the disabled and affords disabled individuals, as members
of a protected class, rights addressing such discrimination in a variety of
contexts.
This Article contends that a parallel blending of the models of functioning at
one level, and of the civil rights and social welfare models at a higher level, is the
future of American disability law. This Article examines a discrete and integral
part of this view, namely, the role of normal species functioning in disability
analysis. Part I of the Article provides background to the ADA and Supreme
Court jurisprudence interpreting the Act. Part II provides an introduction to two
models of functioning: the normal species and alternative modes of functioning
models. Philosophical development of these models is useful for understanding
14. Congress intended to protect disabled individuals as a matter of civil right in a manner
similar to race, gender, religion, and national origin.
15. For an excellent discussion of providing accommodations as a matter of justice, see
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Di.j'rentf Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 579 (2004).
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the proper role of functioning in disability analysis. The normal species
functioning model determines eligibility and entitlement to resources based upon
deviation from normal functioning and supports accommodation that furthers
normal functioning. The alternative modes of functioning model supports normal
as well as alternative modes of functioning; it is discussed as a more promising
means to determine the nature of accommodation. Part III discusses how the
Court currently employs the normal species and alternative modes of functioning
models. Part IV proposes a model for Functioning-Based Disability Analysis. A
three-prong test for disability analysis is offered to facilitate proper consideration
of normal species functioning. Functioning-Based Disability Analysis considers
deviation from the normal species functioning baseline when determining
whether someone is disabled and entitled to a remedy under the Act but considers
normal as well as alternative modes of functioning in making accommodations.
The Article concludes by offering some insights into the use of Functioning-
Based Disability Analysis as a means to resolve the tension between the civil
rights and social welfare models of disability law.
I. DISABILITY LAW IN 2005
Prior to explaining different models for contemplating functioning, it is
necessary to discuss the basic provisions of the ADA and judicial construction of
the Act. The ADA contains an eligibility test for disability protections. This test,
known as the disability threshold test, requires that a plaintiff be a "qualified
individual with a disability."' 6 Under Titles II and III, a qualified individual with
a disability must have a disability and be discriminated against on the basis of
it.' 7 In addition, Title I requires that the individual be able to perform the
"essential functions" of a job "with or without reasonable accommodation"; this
is known as the essential functions test.18
Under each title, an individual is first assessed for disability. An individual is
"disabled" if she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities ... a record of such an impairment; or [is]
being regarded as having such an impairment."' 9 Determination of disability
entails an "individualized inquiry," meaning that the facts pertaining to the
alleged disability in each case are analyzed under established statutory tests, and
generalizations cannot be made for a given condition nor can a condition be
considered a per se disability. 20 In addition, disability is assessed from a post-
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12132, 12182 (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
20. Id.; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). But see U.S. Airways, Inc.
VI:2 (2006)
6
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol6/iss2/1
A JURISPRUDENCE OF DYSFUNCTION
mitigated state, that is, after ameliorative drugs or devices are employed l
The definition of disability is broken into three parts by the Supreme Court.
An individual must have: (1) a physical or mental impairment that (2)
substantially (3) limits a major life activity. The Supreme Court has closely
followed the EEOC regulations for physical or mental impairment, which require
an organic defect causing a disease, disorder, condition, or other biological
anomaly. 22 The most contentious aspect of the physical impairment part of the
threshold test is determination of the point at which the organic defect becomes
an impairment. While one must typically be mildly to strongly symptomatic to be
covered under the Act, the Supreme Court has recognized an individual with
asymptomatic AIDS as having a physical impairment.:- Coverage of mental
impairments is generally limited; ADA protection of individuals with mental
impairments that do not result from an organic defect is even more restricted.24
The requirement that a disability be a "substantial" limitation of a major life
activity has been interpreted in such a way that it has become a significant hurdle
to recovery inder the Act. The Court has followed the EEOC regulations, which
state that in order to be substantially limited in a major life activity, an individual
must be "unable to perform ... [or] [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration tinder which [she] can perform a particular major life activity
v. Barnett. 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2001) ("The statute does not require proof on a case-by-case basis
that a seniority system should prevail .... because it would not be reasonable in the run of cases
that the assignment in question trump the rules of a seniority system.").
21. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471: see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). These mitigating measures are typically
employed by the individual to facilitate daily functioning.
22. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(l)-(2) (2005) ("Physical or mental impairment means: (1) Any
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.").
23. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
24. See. e.g., Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding an individual with
anxiety and workplace stress is not disabled); Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506 (7th
Cir. 2001) (finding an individual with anxiety attacks is unable to fulfill the essential function of
handling emergency calls); Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding an
individual with workplace stress and depression is not disabled); Guerra v. Garratt, 564 N.W.2d
121 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (finding an individual suffering from repressed memories is not
disabled); Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding an individual
with workplace stress is not disabled); DeWitt v. Carsien, 941 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(finding an individual with anxiety and workplace stress is not disabled).
7
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as compared to . . . the average person in the general population., 25 This
determination is made by considering "[t]he nature and severity of the
impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of
or resulting from the impairment., 26 In four of the last five Supreme Court
opinions addressing "substantially," the Court found that the plaintiffs were not
disabled.27
The set of major life activities recognized by the Court is small. The EEOC
issued regulations for Title I that list examples of major life activities, including
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working., 28 This list encapsulates the major life activities
recognized by most courts. The Supreme Court has also recognized the major life
activity of reproduction,29 and currently there is a circuit split over whether
interacting with others is a major life activity.3°
Most recently, in 2002, the Court decided Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (2005); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
195-96 (2002); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565 (requiring a "significant restriction," not just a
"difference").
26. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (2005).
27. Compare Toyota, 534 U.S. 184 (finding that a plaintiff is not "substantially limit[ed]" in a
major life activity and is ineligible for disability protections under Title I), Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555 (same), Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (same), and Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (same), with Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624 (finding the plaintiff is
"substantially limit[ed]" in a major life activity and eligible for disability protections under Title
III).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005).
29. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
30. Compare Soileau v. Guildford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (lst Cir. 1997) (holding that
interacting with others should not be a major life activity) with Jacques v. DiMarzio, 386 F.3d 192
(2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a plaintiff with bipolar disorder was not substantially limited in the
major life activity of interacting with others), and McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d
1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that interacting with others is a major life activity). Several other
courts have declined to address directly the issue of whether interacting with others is a major life
activity but have held that plaintiffs were not "substantially limited" in interacting with others. See,
e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations, 375 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metro
Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2003); MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326,
337 (6th Cir. 2002); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2001). For a
scholarly account of this issue, see Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1139 (2002). Disability law scholar
Ann Hubbard has suggested that "belonging" should also be recognized as a major life activity. See
Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2004); see also
Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997 (2004).
VI:2 (2006)
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Kentucky v. Williams, which held that the test for a major life activity is whether
the activity is "of central importance to most people's daily lives."3t In Toyota,
the Court applied this test narrowly and found that the manual task particular to
Williams's job, namely, "repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or
above shoulder level[] for extended periods of time," was not an activity that is
of central importance to most people's daily lives. 32 The Court then turned to
other activities in Williams's life to determine that she was impaired in some
household manual tasks but not those of central importance to most people in
daily living. 33  In finding Williams could not establish impairment in work-
related or other household manual tasks, the Court set a high hurdle for
establishing a substantial impairment of a major life activity.
Even if a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that she is disabled under the ADA,
a plaintiff suing under Title I must show that she is able to fulfill the "essential
functions" of her job "with or without reasonable accommodation" in order to be
a qualified individual with a disability. 34 The essential functions requirement
places the plaintiff in a predicament under current Supreme Court precedent: It is
difficult to prove disability in a post-mitigated state under the Act, but if one
appears too disabled, one may be deemed unable to fulfill the essential functions
of one's job and ineligible for disability protections. In the last four Title I cases
decided by the Court, plaintiffs were determined to be both not disabled under
the Act and too impaired to meet employers' job requirements. 3
Nevertheless, some plaintiffs manage to establish eligibility for protections
under the Act. Under current judicial construction of the Act, if an individual is a
qualified individual with a disability, she is entitled to a remedy with no further
31. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197-98.
32. Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 202 ("[S]he could still brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden,
fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the house ... her medical conditions caused her to
avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she
plays with her children, gardens, and drives long distances.").
34. The plain language allows employers much discretion in determining the essential
functions of a job: "[Clonsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions
of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). The regulations add, in part, that a function
may be essential if the position exists to perform that function, a limited number of employees can
perform it, or the employee was hired to perform that function because of expertise or ability to do
so. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(n)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2005).
35. Toyota, 534 U.S. 184; Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
9
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analysis. That remedy may include an accommodation. 36 For Title I, in a post-
hiring context, this may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
or examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
37
For Title II, the remedy may entail access to services, including publicly operated
mass transit. Title III requires access to places of "public accommodation,"
encompassing a wide variety of venues from zoos to doctors' offices as well as
transportation services provided by private entities.38
While the statute does not require it, the EEOC has encouraged an
"interactive process" in which an employer and employee work together to
determine an employee's accommodation. 39 This process is adopted in some
circuits.40 Even with an interactive process, the employer, by statute, is only
required to make one reasonable accommodation.41 The offered accommodation
might not be what the employee prefers.42 An employee may reject an offered
36. Other equitable relief and civil penalties are also possible. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a) (2000); 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)-(10) (2000). In pre-hiring situations, an individual cannot be denied
an employment opportunity because of the need for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(b) (2005).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
39. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2005). Much remains unresolved about the effect of the
reasonable accommodation provision. Some argue that it may be cost shifting (to the employer),
cost avoidance (by the employer), or cost sharing (between the employer and employee). See
Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three Faces of
Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1175 (2002).
40. See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2003); Humphrey v.
Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001); Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel,
Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001); Beck v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996);
Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638 (1 st Cir. 1996) (stating that accommodation
is required only in some cases); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000) (discussing "the" or "an," meaning one, accommodation);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. sec. 1630.9, at 375-77 (2005) (discussing "a," meaning one,
reasonable accommodation).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. sec. 1630.9, at 377 ("If more than one of these accommodations will
enable the individual to perform the essential functions or if the individual would prefer to provide
his or her own accommodation, the preference of the individual with a disability should be given
VI:2 (2006)
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accommodation, but the employer is not required to make an alternative one,
even if the employee is no longer able to fulfill the essential functions of her
job.43
The Act provides employers (or other entities under Titles 11 and Ill) two
affirmative defenses for failing to make a reasonable accommodation: "undue
hardship",44 and "direct threat., 45 It is unlawful to fail to make a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled employee, "unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business., 46 "Undue hardship" is defined as "significant
difficulty or expense," in light of a number of factors including cost, the
resources and number of employees of the covered entity or facilities involved in
the accommodation, and the impact of the accommodation upon the facilities
making it.47 This determination is subject to substantial judicial discretion, with
little guidance from the EEOC; the Interpretative Guidance issued by the agency
states merely that an employer should not be forced to provide an
accommodation that is "unduly costly. ' 48 In addition, an employer need not
provide an accommodation for an employee that poses a "direct threat to the
health or safety of other[s]. 49
Recovery under the ADA in 2005 is akin to a complex trifecta; plaintiffs
must succeed at three levels. First, the ADA includes restrictions on disability
protections, namely, the eligibility requirement of the disability threshold test, the
essential functions requirement of Title I, and the undue hardship and direct
threat defenses. Second, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the language
of the Act in interpreting these requirements and by requiring that a plaintiff be
assessed in a post-mitigated state. This Article addresses a third limitation to
recovery: improper use of a baseline of normal species functioning to determine
eligibility for protection, entitlement to remedy, and the nature of remedy. We
will return to this limitation in Part Ill. First it is necessary to examine the
different models for conceptualizing functioning.
primary consideration. However, the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate
discretion to choose between effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive
accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for it to provide.").
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (2005).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. sec. 1630.2(p), at 371 (2005).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (holding that
a direct threat is one that poses a "significant risk" to others and is based upon "medical or other
objective evidence").
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING FUNCTIONING
A. Normal Species Functioning
Normal species functioning, or species-typical functioning, is a concept that
originated in the field of biology, most notably in the work of Christopher Boorse
in the 1970s. 5° It is used to describe both functioning that benefits the survival of
the species, which may not be expressed by a majority of species members, and
functioning that is exhibited by a majority of members of a species, regardless of
whether it serves the genetic fitness of the organism." The latter concept of
normal species functioning was used over a decade later by philosopher Norman
Daniels, in Just Health Care52 and in supporting works, to address the just
distribution of health care services. Normal species functioning provides a
baseline for distinguishing basic from non-basic health care services. Services
that are aimed at preventing deviation from or restoring, in whole or in part,
normal functioning, are considered basic health care services, while services that
merely support long-term disability are not. Daniels argues that distributive
justice requires access to the former but not the latter range of services.
Today, normal species functioning is the dominant philosophical paradigm
for the just distribution of health care services. Recent legal scholarship suggests
that normal species functioning is useful in determining both level of impairment
and the protections and compensation that impairments may require.53
50. See, e.g., Christopher Boorse, Health as a Theoretical Concept, 44 PHIL. Sci. 542 (1977);
Christopher Boorse, On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 49 (1975)
[hereinafter Boorse, On the Distinction]; Christopher Boorse, What a Theory of Mental Health
Should Be, 6 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 61 (1976); see also Christopher Boorse, Concepts of Health,
in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 359-93 (Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds.,
1987).
51. See, e.g., Boorse, On the Distinction, supra note 50, at 57.
52. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
53. A Lexis search on August 15, 2005, revealed thirty-seven articles invoking Daniels's
philosophical theory to inform legal analysis about just compensation. See, e.g., Adrienne Ash,
Disability Equality and Prenatal Genetic Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 315 (2003); Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective of Health Care Insurance Reform, 19
AM. J.L. MED. & ETHICS 37, 47-55 (1993); Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the
Sutton Court's Closeting of Disabilities, 43 How. L.J. 499 (2000); Laura E. Cunningham, National
Health Insurance and the Medical Deduction, 50 TAx L. REV. 237 (1995); Einer Elhauge,
Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1468-69 (1994); John A. Flippen, The
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Program and Managed Medicaid Mental
Health Care: The Need to Reevaluate the EPSDT in the Managed Care Era, 50 VAND. L. REV. 683
(1997); Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health Insurance
VI:2 (2006)
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Unfortunately, much of this literature misconstrues Daniels's theory, so it is
necessary to begin with a fairly detailed discussion of his framework.
5 4
In Just Health Care, Daniels presents a contractarian theory derived from
John Rawls's A Theory qf Justice, arguing for the distribution of health care
resources according to a baseline of functioning considered normal for the human
Coverage fbr Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV. 203 (1999); Sharona
Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659
(2003); Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of
Not-for-Projit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L REV. 1345 (2003); Paul E. Kalb, Defining an "Adequate"
Package of Health Care Benefits, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1987 (1992); Russell Korobkin, Determining
Health Care Rightsf iom Behind a Veil ofIgnorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 801 (1998); Mark E.
Meaney, A Deliberative Model of Corporate Medical Management, 28 JiL. MED. & ETHICS 125
(2000); Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 671 (1999); Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law of Above Averages: Leveling the New Genetic
Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REv. 517 (2000); E. Haavi Morreim, Quality of Life:
Erosions and Opportunities Under Managed Care, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 144 (2000); E. Haavi
Morreim, Playing Doctor. Corporate Medical Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 939 (1999); David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and
Unlair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1996); Pendo, supra note
39; Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1121 (2004); Eric Rakowski, Who Should PayVor Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1354-
56 (2002); Ted Schrecker, Private Health Care for Canada: North of the Border, an Idea Whose
Time Shouldn't Come?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 138 (1998); Michael H. Shapiro, Does
Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten Human Equality and Democracy?, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 769 (2002): Michael H. Shapiro, The Impact of Genetic Enhancement on Equality,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561 (1999); Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection:
Performance Enhancement and the Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 11 (1991); Rory
Weiner, Universal Health Insurance Under State Equal Protection Law, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
327 (2002).
54. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 53, at 47 (discussing health care as a "Rawlsian primary
social good" when Daniels specifically rejects this idea and presents only a conditional extension of
Rawls's fair equality of opportunity principle, see DANIELS, supra note 52, at 43-48); Elhauge,
supra note 53, at 1468-69 (misunderstanding the connection between normal species functioning
and the normal opportunity range by suggesting pain that does not prevent one from achieving life
goals would fail to be considered a deviation from normal functioning); Pratt, supra note 53, at
1162 (referring to Daniels's theory as one of "explicit rationing" when it instead embraces one of
allocation of resources over a lifetime); Rakowski, supra note 53, at 1354-55 (failing to understand
Daniels's treatment versus enhancement distinction); Weiner, supra note 53, at 337, 345-46
(misunderstanding the "normal opportunity range" as "the range of life plans otherwise open to a
person but for his unmet health care needs" when it speaks well beyond health needs, that Daniels's
theory recognizes impairment to normal species functioning may limit more than health, and that
Daniels's account of the elderly adjusts for natural changes in the normal opportunity range).
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species.55 Under Daniels's theory, resources are distributed to support normal
species functioning.56 Most succinctly stated, normal species functioning is the
level of functioning typically associated with "membership [in] a natural
species, " where non-species-typical functioning is the result of biological
defect.57 Daniels interprets normal functioning as functioning without disease,
though his theory could apply to biological impairments that are not diseases but
affect normal species functioning.58
Daniels argues that normal species functioning requires the provision of
health care services that support a normal opportunity range. 59 The normal
opportunity range allows individuals to pursue reasonable life plans and goals
relative to individual "skills and talents., 60 Thus, one must have a disease (or
biological defect) that impacts this range in order to be entitled to health care
services. The range includes health care services that contribute to basic health
55. DANIELS, supra note 52, at 26-58. More specifically, Daniels extends a weak, conditional
version of the second part of Rawls's second principle of justice, the fair equality of opportunity
principle, to health care aimed at supporting normal species functioning. Rawls's principle, which
states that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are... attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity," is applied to
health care by Daniels on the basis that health care is a special good that directly affects
opportunity. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (1971). Daniels's theory is an extension of fair
equality of opportunity because, like Rawls's theory, it supports more than a formal, or negative
notion of equality of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity under Rawls and Daniels seeks to
correct for detrimental influences rather than just remove barriers to equality of opportunity. This
Article assumes that a sound principle of justice includes fair equality of opportunity and that
Daniels presents an acceptable extension of fair equality of opportunity without presupposing
acceptance of A Theory of Justice.
56. DANIELS, supra note 52, at 26-28.
57. Id. (citation omitted) ("The basic idea is that health is the absence of disease, and
diseases .. .include deformities and disabilities that result from trauma. ... ). Of course our
conception of what is "normal" is, to some extent, the product of our evolutionary history and
social environment. This does not affect the value of the baseline but rather cautions one generally
against overstating the connection between disease and disability. See PHILIP KITCHER, THE LtvES
TO COME 213 (1996). Our evolutionary history entails development of culture and the capacity for
reflective choice, and this weakens the relationship between natural selection and what humans
view as valuable. That is, our evolutionary history demonstrates that there are social elements to
preferred modes of functioning. Focusing on normal species functioning, then, may entrench
subjective views about functioning without considering the benefits that other modes of functioning
may offer. See id.
58. DANIELS, supra note 52, at 28.
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care needs.6
According to Daniels, to support the normal opportunity range the basic tier
of health care required by the biomedical model (and concomitantly distributive
justice) is that which is necessary to support normal species functioning. He
considers the impact of different types of health care institutions upon normal
functioning in order to inform his conception of basic health care. Candidate
levels of institutions are those that:
(1) Prevent disease; maintain the health of those who are functionally
normal through preventative care,
(2) Cure disease; restore the health of those who are ill to normal
functioning by providing "medical and rehabilitative services,"
(3) Compensate for disease; maintain those with mild chronic ailments,
disability, or age-related health needs by bringing them closer to normal
functioning with "social support" and "extended medical services," and
(4) Support disease; provide "health care and related social services" for the
severely disabled or seriously chronically ill individuals who cannot be
brought closer to normal functioning by providing palliative or other
care.
62
Daniels argues that normal species functioning requires the provision of
health care services to prevent illness, restore health, or compensate for loss of
health. As a result, distributive justice requires the services of the first three
levels of health care institutions listed above. Supporting disease (that is,
providing health care or social services for the severely disabled or chronically
ill) is not aimed at preserving opportunity for functional normality and may
exceed the bounds of justice.63
Daniels's model is a medical model, as it focuses upon the presence or
absence of disease (or biological defect) to determine entitlement to resources.
Normal species functioning, based upon the absence of disease, is used as the
61. Id. at 19-45. While Daniels assumes a strict biomedical model of health care needs (that is,
disease alone is believed to impede the normal opportunity range) he utilizes a broad conception of
personal medical services and other social services that operate to support this model of distributive
justice. Id. at 28-32. Daniels identifies the broad range of services that meet these needs as: "(1)
[a]dequate nutrition, shelter, (2) [s]anitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions, (3)
[e]xercise, rest, and some other features of life-style, (4) [p]reventative, curative, and rehabilitative
personal medical services, [and] (5) [n]on-medical personal and social support services." Id. at 32.
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id. at 48. It seems, however, that services provided by fourth-tier institutions would
preserve some aspects of normal opportunity. Health care for a severely mentally disabled person
may afford her the opportunity to enjoy music, touch, friendship, or love. Even palliative care may
allow a dying person the opportunity to prepare psychologically for death.
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natural and relevant baseline for functioning in this context. An individual is
entitled to resources to prevent movement from, or back towards, this manner of
functioning. Daniels limits entitlement where resources would only support,
rather than improve, disease. While the environment may cause deviation from
normal functioning, Daniels's model, as a medical model, is concerned with
ameliorating or preventing biological defects of individuals to promote normal
opportunity rather than altering the environment, so long as pollution is
controlled and other basic needs, such as sanitation, are accounted for.64
In addition, Daniels gives preference to prevention over restoration and
restoration over compensation in order to restore normal species functioning: "It
is preferable to prevent than to have to cure, and to cure than to have to
compensate for loss of functioning., 65 By "compensation," Daniels means
services to manage disease and possibly disability. For example, cochlear
implants might be made available to a deaf child in order to restore hearing
instead of a voucher for a school for the deaf that teaches American Sign
66Language as a social support to compensate for loss of hearing.
The example of the deaf child illustrates why Daniels's normal species
functioning model, though focused upon health care, is relevant to disability
analysis. First, under Daniels's framework, a deaf child has an impaired health
state, or is disabled, due to her hearing deficit, which is the product of disease or
biological defect. This impairment prevents her from operating in a manner
typical for our species. Second, the child is entitled to resources to bring her as
close as possible to normal functioning. Third, applying Daniels's model to the
nature of the entitlement, any remedy or accommodation will prioritize the
restoration of normal species functioning over accommodation that supports
64. Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 48. It is important to note that Daniels does not give moral priority to one level of
health care institutions over another, since the first three levels together support equality of
opportunity. Nevertheless, an inherent preference for restoration over compensation underscores
the inability of his model to consider alternative modes of functioning to support equality of
opportunity.
66. Cochlear implants are the subject of much controversy in the medical ethics literature, as
there is evidence to suggest that the implants are not very effective, and, as a result, a deaf child
who undergoes the procedure may be unable to enter the hearing world in a meaningful way. See,
e.g., National Association of the Deaf, Cochlear Implants: NAD Position Statement (Oct. 6, 2000),
available at http://www.nad.org/site/pp.asp?c=foINKQMBF&b=138140; see also Satz & Silvers,
supra note 12, at 173. Children with the implants may feel trapped between the hearing world and
the deaf community. Id. What is clear is that, without the implant, the child will be a member of the
deaf community, which is itself rich in history, culture, and tradition. Nevertheless, in Daniels's
terms, Sign language is not morally equivalent to a cochlear implant. See Dena Davis, Genetic
Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future, 27 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7, 12 (1997).
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alternative modes of functioning. The deaf child is entitled to health care
services, such as a cochlear implant, to bring her as close as possible to hearing.
Alternative modes of functioning, such as American Sign Language, would not
be considered, as they would fail to restore her to a manner of functioning that is
normal for our species.
In sum, under the normal species functioning model, if an individual does
not function in a manner that is normal for our species due to biological disease
(or defect), she is disabled.6 7 In addition, the normal species functioning baseline
only supports remedies that facilitate functioning that is normal for our species;
alternative, effective modes of functioning are not considered. The model seeks
to eliminate or ameliorate disease or defect by altering the disabled person rather
than the environment. In other words, disability is understood to be of biological
rather than social ontology.
Under the normal species functioning model, only an individual who has a
disease that impairs normal functioning is presumed to be entitled to resources to
restore normal functioning. The prevention or elimination of impairment of
normal species functioning is valued over compensation and support for
disability by means of various accommodations or mitigating measures that may
facilitate alternative modes of functioning. Laws embracing the normal species
functioning model recognize an individual that deviates from normal functioning
as disabled and direct resources toward preventing deviation from, maintaining,
and restoring normal species functioning, instead of accommodating alternative
forms of functioning that may not be normal for the species.
Thus, being able to answer the questions of when and how normal
functioning matters to disability analysis is vital to understanding whether
someone is disabled and what legal protections are owed. Before progressing
further, however, it is necessary to consider what the normal species functioning
model does not take into account. Again, philosophical works are of assistance. It
has long been recognized by philosophers who write about disability that the
normal species functioning model does not contemplate effective, alternative
modes of functioning.68 Normal species functioning is concerned only with
manner or mode of functioning and does not look to functional outcomes. For
67. The implications of considering an individual disabled who functions effectively in an
atypical manner will be addressed in Subsection IV.B. 1. An individual may also function atypically
but in a manner that is more effective than normal functioning. For example, if Einstein's brain
functioned atypically, he would not be disabled because his normal functioning range would fail to
be impaired.
68. See. e.g., Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION 13-
145 (Anita Silvers et al. eds., 1998); Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 102-10 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000).
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example, a normal species functioning approach would view walking to the street
corner as a desired manner of functioning but not wheeling to the comer, even
though both may bring about the same outcome.
B. Alternative Modes of Functioning
In Harrison Bergeron, Kurt Vonnegut provides an extreme view of social
equality, where citizens' talents and attributes are equalized to the lowest
common denominator. 69 As dictated by the Handicapper General, the attractive
must wear sacks over their heads, the slender weights on their bodies, and the
intelligent thought-scrambling devices. 70 Disabilities are socially constructed in
order to equalize abilities across a given population. Obviously, disability anti-
discrimination laws do not seek to equalize abilities but to make the opportunities
of those with impaired functioning more equal to those without disabilities.
Nevertheless, Vonnegut poignantly raises the question of whether promoting
equality requires changing the individual or society.
Unlike proponents of the normal species functioning model, advocates for
alternative modes of functioning believe that it is not the individual functioning
atypically who should be changed; rather, society should adapt to that
individual's method of atypical functioning. This is an expression of a social
model of disability. Such models generally stand for the proposition that
disability is the result of a hostile social environment rather than impairment of
normal biology. There is a spectrum of social disability, of course. It is useful
here to invoke a concept I develop elsewhere between categorical and relative
disability.71 A disability is categorical if no reasonable adjustment in one's social
environment-such as installing elevators and ramps, providing traffic crossings
with audible signals, making reading materials available in Braille, or lowering
door handles-further enables functionality. 72 A disability is relative, or not
categorical, if social adjustment enables functionality.73 The greater the degree of
social construction of a disability, the less categorical a disability becomes.
Stated another way, the ability to function depends upon how hostile or
accommodating the environment is to someone with a particular disability.
Social models of disability, regardless of where the disabilities they
encompass fall on the spectrum, are based upon two premises: a right to
participation in certain social endeavors (such as education, work, and travel) and
69. KuRT VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HousE 7 (1968).
70. Id.
71. Ani B. Satz, Testing Access: Toward a Theory of Entitlement to Genetic Testing 286-93
(June 30, 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University) (on file with author).
72. Id. at 286.
73. Id. at 286-87.
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a right to particular outcomes from functioning (as distinguished from modes of
functioning) within certain environments.74 Both the medical model embraced by
the normal species functioning baseline and the alternative modes of functioning
supported by the social model (hereinafter the alternative modes of functioning
model) may promote a right to participation; this is, in fact, the purpose of
Daniels's normal opportunity range. The latter premise is what distinguishes the
alternative modes of functioning model from the normal species functioning
model.75 As Anita Silvers and Ron Amundson argue, the alternative modes of
functioning model opposes promoting one type of functioning over others, or
what they term "functional determinism. ' 76 The alternative modes of functioning
model looks to results.
It is necessary to separate the question about whether the alternative modes
of functioning model should be used to determine whether someone is disabled
from the question about whether she is entitled to a remedy, and, if so, what the
nature of that remedy should be. Under the alternative modes of functioning
model, an individual is disabled if she is unable to function to a particular degree
due to a certain social environment. She may be entitled to a remedy depending
upon available external resources and her own ability to mitigate her socially
constructed disability. Those who are disabled by a particular environment may
be entitled to accommodation that results in changes to that environment:
structures, work schedules, etc. These accommodations may support manners of
functioning that are effective, though not normal for our species.
Since mitigation and resources play a role under the normal species
functioning model as well, the key differences between the two models lie with
determining whether an individual is disabled and the nature of accommodation.
The conception of disability under the alternative modes of functioning model is
controversial, since it may greatly expand the protected class. For this reason,
many reject the notion that a disability can be entirely socially created; they
argue that a disability must have a biological component. Elucidation of the
categorical and relative spectrum is useful here. To use an oft-cited example
attributed to Silvers, placing a food dish for a Dachshund on the kitchen counter
and a food dish for a Great Dane on the kitchen floor would impair their ability to
eat; the Dachshund may in fact starve.77 Adjusting the dogs' environment by
74. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between the social and medical models see
Silvers, supra note 68, at 59-85, 94-95. See also Amundson, supra note 68, at 102-06.
75. One could be concerned with functional outcomes but embrace a biological approach. This
would, however, collapse into the normal species functioning model. I am discussing the alternative
modes of functioning model of disability as an outcome-based approach that supports functioning
other than species-typical functioning.
76. Amundson, supra note 68, at 102-10; Silvers, supra note 68, at 13-145.
77. Silvers, supra note 68, at 127.
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switching the food bowls would enable both to eat with ease. This is an example
of an entirely socially created disability, or a relative disability. Similarly, parents
of children of short stature have argued that their children should have access to
Human Growth Hormone because, in some parts of western society, short stature
is disabling.78
On the other end of the spectrum are diseases or other biological conditions
that result in an extremely low level of basic functioning and are categorically
disabling, as no amount of social accommodation would facilitate less
impairment to functioning. Some cases include the genetic diseases Lesch-Nyan
syndrome, Tay-Sachs disease, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy, where one or
more major life functions are seriously affected at birth or during early
childhood.79
Impairments that fall in the middle of the spectrum are more difficult to
assess for the social construction of disability. Here internal assessments about
one's ability to function weigh heavily in determining whether a disability is
socially constructed. Some individuals with carpal tunnel syndrome, for example,
may believe that with requisite social supports they are able to function fully in
society. Others with the same condition, with or without the social supports, may
view themselves as disabled, though perhaps less so than someone with Tay-
Sachs disease or another systemically degenerative disease. In some cases,
disabling conditions are considered enriching or beneficial, based upon social
structure, and are desired.80
If conditions and diseases in the middle of the spectrum contain a biological
element, the alternative modes of functioning model could be recast as one that
measures deviation from normal functioning just as easily as one that measures
socially induced impairment. Arguably for cases that do not involve complete
social impairment, the alternative modes of functioning model does not add much
in terms of contemplating who is disabled. At most it serves as a reminder that
not every disease that impairs normal species functioning should be considered
categorically disabling or eradicated: What is relevant is the degree of
impairment of functioning, and this may depend, in part, upon environment.
78. These individuals may be inspired by studies correlating height to adult income. See e.g.,
Haakon E. Meyer & Randi Selmer, Income, Education Level and Body Height, 26 ANNALS HUM.
BIOLOGY 219-27 (1999).
79. This assumes, of course, that no treatments for these conditions are developed.
80. Consider the arguments of some deaf individuals that being deaf enables one to participate
in the rich culture and traditions of the deaf community. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
Similarly, being born with achondroplasia (dwarfism) may be advantageous in terms of child
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In the accommodation context, a person is already determined to be disabled
and entitled to a remedy, and the sole question is what mode of functioning
should be supported to attain a given outcome. The normal species model
supports only normal functioning. The alternative modes of functioning model
eschews this functional determinism by considering accommodation that
supports various methods of functioning to reach an outcome. A warehouse
worker with a back problem, for example, may lift heavy objects with a
mechanical device instead of wearing a back brace. The environment is adapted
to the person instead of adapting the person to the environment. It is in this
context that the alternative modes of functioning model holds much promise. We
will return to this matter in Section IV.B.
C. Manner of Functioning Versus Functional Outcomes
Often the normal species and alternative modes of functioning models are
confused. As Silvers and others correctly argue, using normal species functioning
as a baseline may confuse three different categories of actions, each of which has
varying implications for how one views disability: "standardizing biological
states," promoting familiar modes of functioning, and striving for particular
outcomes.8 ' Standardizing biological states involves accommodations that allow
individuals to function in biologically similar ways to other individuals. In other
words, the mode of functioning is emphasized over the result of functioning. An
individual might undergo particular surgery or drug treatment to enable her body
to function in a similar way to most individuals' bodies, such as separating
webbed fingers or toes so that each digit functions independently.
82
Promoting familiar or normal modes of functioning entails accommodations
that allow individuals to execute functions in ways that are most familiar, while
not necessarily involving biological standardization. Encouraging, though not
requiring, Hannah the computer programmer to use upper arm prostheses rather
than her fleshy feet to type is an example. Obviously there may be overlap
between the first two categories that Silvers presents, if biological
standardization is involved in promoting familiar modes of functioning. If, for
example, after learning that Hannah is more efficient and physically comfortable
typing with her feet, the employer only allows office modifications to support
typing with her artificial limbs, the accommodation moves toward biological
standardization.
The important difference, though, is between Silvers's first two categories
and her third. The first two emphasize a manner or mode of functioning, the third
81. See Satz & Silvers, supra note 12, at 183.
82. 1 am grateful to Anita Silvers for this example.
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functional outcomes. Silvers rightly argues that normal species functioning looks
to manner or mode of functioning rather than functional outcomes. An alternative
modes of functioning approach does not require any particular mode of
functioning, only a certain functional result.
Instruments commonly used in other contexts to measure loss of functioning
confuse functional outcomes with manner of functioning. 83 Consider one health
status index, which measures "physical activity" and "mobility." 84 According to
the index, a person who walks without assistance is given four points for physical
activity and five points for mobility for being able to use public transportation
without special accommodation. 85 An individual employing a tool of assist to
walk is given three and four points, respectively (assuming assistance is needed
to board transportation).86 A person using a wheelchair scores two points for
physical activity.87 Her mobility ranking is three points if she needs assistance
leaving her home and boarding public transit, and the sidewalks outside of her
house are not wheelchair accessible. 88 She could score as high as five points if
modifications are made to her home, outside environment, and public transport.
89
The index assumes that one is less able to travel using a wheelchair than
walking upright (two versus four points on the physical activity scale). However,
those who wheel may travel just as effectively, if not more so, than those who
walk. The mobility scale defines disability relative to social states that do not
foster alternative modes of functioning, such as public mechanisms of
transportation missing equipment for wheelchair use and sidewalks that step
83. These include Activities of Daily Living scales, which are found most notably in the
American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides)
and some health status indexes. The purpose of these scales is to provide physicians with guides for
measuring impairment. While they are not intended for use in estimating damages, the AMA Guides
are used in over forty state workers compensation programs for this purpose. Gen& Stephens
Connolly, Hidden Illness, Chronic Pain: The Problems of Treatment and Recognition of
Fibromyalgia in the Medical Community, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 111, 115 (2002). These
guides are also widely criticized for embedded stereotypes about relevant tasks. Ellen Smith Pryor
argues that the examples in the AMA Guides are blatantly stereotypical, focusing on mopping,
shopping, cooking, and child rearing for women and sports for men. Ellen Smith Pryor, Flawed
Promises: A Critical Evaluation of The American Medical Association's GUIDEs To THE
EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT, 103 HARV. L. REV. 964, 967-75 (1990) (book review).
84. See DAN W. BROCK, LIFE AND DEATH 303 (1993); see also Amundson, supra note 68, at
107 (discussing this particular index as ignoring level of functioning).
85. See sources cited supra note 84.
86. See sources cited supra note 84.
87. See sources cited supra note 84.
88. See sources cited supra note 84.
89. See sources cited supra note 84.
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down to the street instead of slope. Simply adding curb cuts and ramps to buses
and trains would change an individual's mobility ranking, for then those who
wheel and those who walk would score the same (five) points.
Confusing functional outcomes with manner of functioning undervalues
effective, alternative modes of functioning that attain the same functional result
as normal modes of functioning. As a result, accommodation may be diverted to
standardizing biological states or promoting familiar modes of functioning as
opposed to enabling functional outcomes. Careful attention must be paid to the
purpose of disability inquiries in order to determine whether it is the manner
(normal species functioning model) or the outcome of functioning (alternative
modes of functioning model) that is at stake. The Supreme Court has failed to
examine disability inquiries with full appreciation of this distinction and its
consequences.
Ill. FUNCTIONING AND SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
It is uncontroversial that judicial construction of the ADA limits disability
protections. Nevertheless, established Supreme Court tests are not what severely
restrict coverage under the Act. The Court's undirected and improper use of
normal functioning to inform disability analysis is what prevents most protection,
both at the disability threshold stage (which the Court currently interprets as
including eligibility for remedy) and with regard to accommodation.9"
When normal functioning informs disability analysis, an individual is not
disabled or entitled to a remedy if she functions in a manner or mode that is
normal for our species. An individual may be disabled and entitled to a remedy if
she functions in a non-species-typical way. For example, a secretary who is less
efficient than other workers because she takes breaks throughout the day to
monitor her blood sugar and give herself insulin for diabetes may be disabled and
eligible for relief. A secretary who takes the same number of breaks and
maintains an identical work schedule due to a preference for a more relaxed work
day would not be considered disabled and entitled to a remedy. If normal
functioning fails to inform disability analysis, the manner or mode of functioning
no longer matters, and the Court looks to functional outcomes. If the secretary
with diabetes functions effectively with a self-adjusted schedule by working
longer hours, she may not be considered disabled or entitled to a remedy. Thus,
looking to functional outcomes rather than normal species functioning, the two
90. Recall that in the last five Supreme Court opinions addressing "substantially" as part of the
"substantial impairment of a major life activity" test, four plaintiffs were found not to be disabled.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In addition, "major life activity" has been narrowly
construed. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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secretaries might be treated the same.
Under the plain language of the ADA, if an individual is found to be
disabled under the Act, she may be entitled to accommodation; the nature of
accommodation also varies depending upon whether normal species functioning
is considered relevant. If normal species functioning informs accommodation,
only species-typical modes of functioning will be supported. Alternative modes
of functioning are supported by analysis that looks to functional outcomes.
In the disability threshold context, the Supreme Court has in all but one case
failed to invoke normal species functioning in determining whether an individual
is entitled to protection under the ADA. In other words, normal species
functioning is not considered when determining whether an individual has a
substantial impairment of a major life activity. When the Court fails to consider
normal species functioning, an individual who functions effectively in a non-
species-typical manner is not disabled. When the Court considers normal species
functioning, an individual who functions atypically is disabled.
In Bragdon v. Abbott, a Title III public accommodation case, the Court held
that reproduction is a major life activity, finding that an HIV infected woman
could not reproduce in a normal fashion.91 In an opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined, the
Court found that Abbott could not reproduce normally because she posed about a
twenty percent risk of infecting her partner, and there was an eight percent risk of
perinatal transmission.92 In reaching its decision, the Court relied, in part, on an
agency opinion authored by the Office of Legal Counsel of the DOJ, stating,
"HIV-infected individuals cannot, whether they are male or female, engage in the
act of procreation with the normal expectation of bringing forth a healthy
child." 93 Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
O'Connor, in part), dissented on the ground that Abbott did not establish that she
was substantially limited in a major life activity, and that opinion refers to major
life activities as those that "are repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-
day existence of a normally functioning individual. 94 Thus, both the majority
and the dissent appeal to normal functioning to determine elements of the
definition of disability.
91. 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). The majority opinion also engages in a lengthy discussion of
HIV, or presymptomatic AIDS, to determine that it is Abbott's low CD4/CD8 counts that result in
biological impairment. Id. at 633-38. Variation from species normality typically plays a role in the
Court's determination of the "physical or mental impairment" component of the disability threshold
test. See infra Subsection IV.B. 1.
92. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40.
93. Id. at 642-43 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 660.
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One year later, in a trilogy of cases decided by the Court, normal functioning
is deemed irrelevant to determining eligibility under the disability threshold test.
Compare Bragdon with Albertson 's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, a case involving a truck
driver with monocular vision suing under Title I for employment termination.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg and the dissenters in
Bragdon, found that deviation from normal functioning did not indicate
disability; Kirkingburg was not disabled, despite monocular vision. The Court
specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's appeal to normal species functioning:
The Ninth Circuit concluded that 'the manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees
differs significantly from the manner in which most people see' because, 'to
put it in its simplest terms [he] sees using only one eye; most people see using
two.' The Ninth Circuit majority also relied on a recent Eighth Circuit decision,
whose holding it characterized in similar terms: 'It was enough to warrant a
finding of disability . . . that the plaintiff could see out of only one eye: the
manner in which he performed the major life activity of seeing was
different.' . . . But in several respects the Ninth Circuit was too quick to find a
disability . . . . By transforming 'significant restriction' into 'difference,' the
court undercut the fundamental statutory requirement that only impairments
causing 'substantial limitations' in individuals' ability to perform major life
activities constitute disabilities.
95
The effect of attributing different roles to normal species functioning in
disability threshold analysis is illustrated by these two cases. In Bragdon, the
Court is concerned with normal functioning because Abbott could not reproduce
in a manner that is normal for our species; she was therefore limited in the major
life activity of reproduction. The Court did not, for example, consider means of
assisted reproduction available to Abbott, such as artificial insemination (with
drug treatment), to lessen substantially the risk of perinatal HIV transmission and
to avoid the risk to her partner altogether. Nevertheless, in Kirkingburg, the
Court found that the plaintiff was not disabled, even though he failed to see in a
96manner that is typical for our species. Here, it is not the manner of functioning
that matters, but functional outcome, that is, whether Kirkingburg was
substantially limited in functioning despite his impairment. The Court, citing
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.97 another case in the trilogy, found that
Kirkingburg's abilities must be assessed after mitigating measures for his
monocular vision. 98 The Court then reasoned that since Kirkingburg's brain
compensated for the vision defect, he was functional in a non-species-typical
95. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563-65 (1999).
96. Id. at 563-67.
97. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
98. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565-66.
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manner.
99
The Court's position in Kirkingburg on functional outcomes is mirrored in
the other two cases forming the Court's 1999 trilogy, with support from the same
justices: Sutton, 00 involving twin sister pilots with severe myopia who used
special eye glasses to see, and Murphy v. United Parcel Service,'10 pertaining to a
mechanic who took drugs to manage severe hypertension. The language about
functional outcomes is also followed in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky
v. Williams, where Justice O'Connor wrote for a unanimous court, holding that a
woman with severe carpal tunnel syndrome who was able to perform certain
manual household tasks was not disabled.'02
These cases illustrate the effect of considering normal species functioning in
disability analysis. In Bragdon, deviation from normal reproductive functioning
grounds the Court's finding that Abbott was impaired in the major life activity of
reproduction and entitled to disability protections. Failing to invoke this baseline
in Kirkingburg, Sutton, Murphy, and Toyota limits protections for persons with
disabilities. In each of these cases, the plaintiff does not function in a manner that
is normal for the species but mitigates or compensates for impairment, personally
or with medical aids, and is found to be lacking a substantial impairment of a
major life activity. Similar outcomes are found in Supreme Court jurisprudence
under the precursor to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,'0 3 and in lower court
ADA jurisprudence.1
0 4
To draw out the second component to the problem, it is necessary to return
to the hypothetical in the introduction about Hannah the computer programmer.
Recall that Hannah would like office modifications to allow her to type with her
fleshy feet. Suppose her employer fears that this would make other employees
99. Id.
100. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.
101. 527 U.S. at 519-21 (1999) (affirming the lower court's holding that "petitioner's
hypertension is not a disability because his doctor had testified that when petitioner is medicated,
he 'functions normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person does').
102. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
103. See, e.g., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 409-10, 413 n.12 (1979) (holding that a
nursing college under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was not required to accommodate a
student with a serious hearing impairment who could participate in the normal clinical training
program by using an assistant).
104. Compare Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005), Wong v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2005), Genthe v. Quebecor World Lincoln, 383 F.3d 713
(8th Cir. 2004), and Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2003), with Rohan v. Networks
Presentations, LLC, 375 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004), Rossbach v. Miami, 371 F.3d 1354 (1 1th Cir.
2004), Giordano v. New York, 274 F.3d 740 (2d Cir. 2001), and Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165
F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1999).
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and clients uncomfortable and prefers to alter her office to enable Hannah to use
her upper arm prostheses. Remember that under current agency and judicial
construction of the Act, regardless of whether the employer is willing to engage
the employee in an interactive process, the employer retains the right to
determine the nature of the accommodation, so long as it is reasonable.
10 5
Arguably, office adjustments to accommodate upper arm prostheses would be
reasonable, even if the employee would not be quite as happy or efficient in the
workplace as a result.
Thus, under current construction of the ADA, an employer may determine
the manner in which an employee functions in the workplace. While it is largely
an empirical matter whether employers, over the years, will choose to support
normal or alternative modes of functioning, the EEOC's recommended process is
not required by the Court. Given the history of oppression of individuals who
function in atypical ways and recent, though sparse, relevant jurisprudence about
accommodation, there is a valid concern that employers will choose to make
reasonable accommodations that further only species-typical functioning.1
0 6
Generally speaking, the Court has very narrowly construed the reasonable
accommodation mandate of Title 1.107 In US Airways. Inc. v. Barnett,'08 the Court
held that a mail room job provided as a reasonable accommodation to a disabled
employee could be offered to a nondisabled employee under the company's
seniority system, even if no other accommodation was available to the disabled
employee. Due to the seniority system, the position was not "vacant" for
accommodation purposes.' °9 While the holding in this case may be limited to
collectively bargained seniority systems, the Court's narrow construction of the
reasonable accommodation mandate does not inspire hope that accommodations
supporting non-species-typical modes of functioning will be provided to
105. See supra Part I.
106. This may result from ignorance of non-species typical alternatives or from a desire to
"normalize" disabled employees. The accommodation provision is concerned with outcomes, that
is, employing disabled individuals who are able to fulfill the essential functions of their job
regardless of how they do so, for example, by constructing buildings that allow disabled individuals
access whether they walk, wheel, scoot, etc.
107. To date, the Supreme Court has so narrowly construed the disability threshold test that few
cases have made it through to reasonable accommodation analysis. Further, since the Court groups
the inquiry of whether someone is disabled with whether they are entitled to a remedy, analysis
surrounding whether accommodations should be made, and if so, what they should be, is often
muddled with disability eligibility questions, making it difficult to determine how courts approach
reasonable accommodation.
108. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
109. Id. at 399, 403.
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employees under Title I.11° Further, the nature of accommodation is discussed
only in passing in non-employment contexts by the Court, where language
suggests a preference for normal modes of functioning."'
Thus, there are two parts to the problem of how a baseline of normal
functioning is used under current law. Lack of use under the disability threshold
test excludes persons with disabilities from protection under the ADA. Use under
the accommodation mandate may not speak to preferred, more efficient non-
species-typical modes of functioning and further stigmatization of individuals
who function in atypical ways by regarding such methods of functioning as
ineffective or inferior.
IV. FUNCTIONING-BASED DISABILITY ANALYSIS
Functioning-Based Disability Analysis suggests that in order to consider
properly the role of normal species functioning in disability analysis and to
overcome the problems discussed in Part III, it is necessary to separate disability
inquiries about eligibility, entitlement, and the nature of accommodation. One
must then consider whether normal species functioning should inform each
inquiry. Philosophical understanding of normal functioning helps clarify relevant
factors and suggests that the normal species functioning baseline should be
applied to questions of eligibility and entitlement but not to determine the nature
of accommodation.
A. Proposed General Disability Inquiries
Inquiries about disability status, entitlement, and the nature of
110. The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, even more
narrowly construes reasonable accommodation by stating the accommodation should not be made,
as the majority suggests, to "'accommodat[e]' the disabled employee," but rather to
"accommodat[e] ... the known 'physical or mental limitations' of the employee." Id. at 413
(emphasis removed). In other words, Scalia would like to limit accommodations to those that
mitigate the impairment itself rather then workplace obstacles. Such accommodations may not
support alternative modes of functioning. As addressed supra in Part II, accommodation that seeks
to change the individual usually supports normal species functioning.
111. See PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 671-72, 683 (2001) (discussing, under Title III,
how a golf cart accommodation enables a disabled golfer to function closer to the typical walking
golfer); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 608-11 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that,
under Title II, community-based treatment or more normal, integrated treatment for the mentally ill
as advocated by the majority may not serve the needs of some severely mentally disabled
individuals who require more assistance and supervision).
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accommodation are distinct factual questions. 1 2 While they must be separated in
order to clarify the proper role of normal species functioning, the exact wording
of the inquires is not important. This Article offers three general inquiries as a
guide for the courts.
The three general inquiries this Article proposes for Functioning-Based
Disability Analysis are:
(QI) Is person X disabled?
(Q2) If person X is disabled, is she entitled to resources?
(Q3) If person X is disabled, and she is entitled to resources, how should
those resources be used?
This analysis may take on a slightly different shape if a plaintiff is seeking
injunctive relief rather than an accommodation. In these instances, Q2 and Q3
may be read to speak generally to a remedy rather than to resources. "Remedy"
may also apply to resource claims.
Under established Supreme Court tests, QI is akin to the disability threshold
test. That is, a person is disabled if she has a substantial impairment of a major
life activity, a record of such a disability, or is regarded as disabled. While it is
important to emphasize that this question contains three important sub-queries,
namely, (1) whether a disability is a physical or mental impairment and (2)
whether it "substantially limits" (3) a major life activity, this Article argues that
the normal species functioning baseline should be applied in a similar manner to
each of these elements.
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if an individual is considered
disabled and discriminated against on the basis of her disability, she is entitled to
resources, unless one of the two affirmative defenses is relevant (undue hardship
or direct threat) or, under Title I, the worker cannot fulfill the essential functions
of her job. Q2 separates this finding from the disability threshold test (QI) and is
thereby a departure from current judicial construction of the ADA. QI and Q2
are two distinct inquiries. An individual may be disabled under the Act yet not
entitled to an accommodation if she functions in an unimpaired fashion in a given
situation, assuming that there is no other disability-based discrimination.
The second stage of disability analysis is where courts should assess
mitigating measures. Currently the Court considers mitigating measures at the
stage this Article calls QI, categorizing most plaintiffs as not disabled and
denying them protection under the Act. Nevertheless, these individuals are often
considered too impaired by their employers to work. This is the case where there
are perceived safety concerns about functioning, even when they do not arise to
112. I am grateful to Jules Coleman for his insights on this matter. Broader exploration of
Coleman's related works in torts warrants examination elsewhere.
29
Satz: A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
the level of direct threat.'13
Q3 aligns with the reasonable accommodation mandate of the ADA. Under
the language of the Act, the nature of accommodation is to be determined by the
entity under scrutiny; under Title I, this would be the employer, Title 11 the
service provider, and Title III the place of public accommodation. Under Title I,
an employer may engage an employee in an interactive process in order to
determine a preferred accommodation, though this is not required by the Act and
adopted in only some judicial circuits.
1 14
B. Proper Consideration of Normal Species Functioning
In this Section, the application of the normal species functioning baseline is
examined with respect to each disability inquiry. This Article argues that the
normal species functioning baseline should be applied to the first and second
inquiries (QI and Q2) but not to the third (Q3). Legal and philosophical
discussion of functioning helps explain why the normal species functioning
baseline should be applied to inquiries about whether a person is disabled and
entitled to an accommodation under law but not to determine the nature of
accommodation.' 
15
1. Definition of Disability
QI encompasses the disability threshold test, that is, whether an individual
has: (1) a physical or mental impairment that (2) substantially limits (3) a major
life activity. The application of the baseline must be assessed with regard to each
element of the disability threshold test; this Article argues that it should be
applied to all three parts. Applying the normal species functioning baseline to the
disability threshold test (Q I):
Those who function effectively in a manner that is normal for our species are
not disabled, while those who function effectively but in a non-species-typical
manner (due to disease or biological defect) are disabled.
Application of the normal species functioning baseline to "a physical or
113. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527
U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
114. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
115. Functioning-Based Disability Analysis also bears on the non-functional prongs of the
ADA, that is, protections that stem from having a record or history of a disability or being regarded
as having a disability. For the reasons discussed infra, normal species functioning should be applied
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mental impairment" is strongly supported by the EEOC regulations and the
legislative history of the ADA. This statutory requirement is interpreted by the
EEOC and Congress to assume a medial model of disability, impliedly rejecting
a social, or alternative functioning model. The EEOC interprets the phrase to
mean "any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss" to a major body system or "[a]ny mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."' 6 These categories, taken
directly from a House Report, all stem from biological defect or anomaly.' ' 7 The
same report further states that "environmental, cultural, and economic
disadvantages are not in themselves covered." ' ' l Courts have almost uniformly
interpreted this aspect of the disability threshold test to invoke a medical model
of disability." 9
The normal species functioning baseline allows distinctions to be drawn
between individuals seeking accommodations for various needs. It provides a
rough measure for promoting equality among the disabled by promoting a normal
opportunity range. While a more expansive category might be desired, it raises
the problems discussed in Section Il.B, most notably, difficulty in limiting the
protected class. In Sutton, the Court assumes the number of Americans in the
protected class to be roughly forty-three million. 20 While it is disputed that this
number, taken from the Preamble of the ADA, 12 was intended to establish a
ceiling, the alternative modes of functioning model would exceed substantially
this number by allowing any individual, with or without biological defect and
disabled by their environment, to be a potential member of the protected class.1
22
116. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(l)-(2) (2005).
117. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990).
118. Id. at 51-52.
119. As noted in Part 1, it remains unclear whether courts will extend mental impairment to
include conditions of uncertain biological origin or social cause. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
120. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000) (stating that "[slome 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older").
122. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Feldblum, supra note 5, at 154 ("1 can attest that the decision to reference 43 million
Americans with disabilities in the findings of the ADA was made by one staff person and endorsed
by three disability rights advocates, that the decision took about ten minutes to make, and that its
implications for the definition of disability were never considered by these individuals. Moreover,
it was my sense during passage of the ADA that this finding was never considered by any Member
of Congress, either on its own merits or as related to the definition of disability.").
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This would arguably fly in the face of what Congress intended. Invoking the
normal species functioning baseline at the first stage of disability analysis would
limit the protected class, as disability would be measured relative to a biological
baseline of what is normal for our species.
There is a question, though, as to whether the normal species functioning
baseline should be applied to "substantially limits" and "major life activity,"
given the social influences on what one recognizes as significant life activities
and a "substantial limit[ation]" of those activities. The plain language of the
statute is not helpful here, and the EEOC Regulations and Congressional Record
seem to reject an alternative modes of functioning approach. The EEOC
regulations define "a substantial impairment of a major life activity" with
reference to "the average person in the general population.' ' 23 In this context,
"substantially" and "major life activity" are not separated. This aligns with
Congress's account of "a substantial impairment of a major life activity": "A
person is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first prong
of the definition when the individual's important life activities are restricted as to
the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in
comparison to most people. 1 24 It is left largely to the courts to determine the role
of social influence upon "substantially" as separate from "major life activity."
It is here that the Supreme Court abandons the medical model in part. In the
1999 trilogy, the Court finds no substantial impairment in three different
contexts, due to the individual's ability to mitigate a particular disability.
Eligibility for disability protections is assessed not according to the degree of
biological impairment as compared to the rest of the species but only after tools
of assist and other mitigating measures are employed. This appears to look to the
alternative modes of functioning model, or to functional outcomes. There is a
strong argument to be made, though, that the Court does not intend to invoke the
alternative modes of functioning model at this stage and is simply engaging in its
mitigation analysis too early. As argued in Section IV.A, consideration of
mitigating measures should come into play at the next level of inquiry, the
question whether someone is entitled to resources. Because the Court combines
these inquiries, the analysis is confused. Further indication that the Court may not
wish to look to the alternative modes of functioning model at the disability
threshold stage is that, when contemplating the meaning of "major life activity,"
123. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2005). An individual with a substantial impairment of a major
life activity is "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [she]
can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." Id.
at § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
124. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990) (emphasis added).
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it returns to speaking of a biological majority. In Toyota Motor MaanuJcturing,
Kentucky v. Williams, the Court interprets major life activities to be those that are
of "central importance to most people's daily lives."'' 2 5 Thus, current regulations
and statutory and common law give us no reason to invoke the alternative modes
of functioning model at this level of disability analysis.
Applying the alternative modes of functioning model at the level of
"substantial" and "major life activity" is problematic for the same reasons it is
troublesome to apply it to "the physical or mental impairment" prong. Put
simply, it is too difficult to know who to exclude from the class of disabled
individuals when sorting through distributive justice claims, if major life
activities are not defined relative to a majority of our species. Applying the
alternative modes of functioning model to "substantial" would also likely
encounter the difficulty that individuals who are particularly creative in
overcoming impairments, or who are very resilient or able to work harder for the
same level of functioning, would not be considered disabled. These individuals
would not be entitled to a remedy unless they are no longer able to compensate
for their disability, holding them hostage to their self-mitigating measures.
On the other hand, individuals who function effectively in atypical ways
may resent being characterized as disabled. Under the current judicial
construction of the ADA, where the question of disability and entitlement to
resources are considered together as a threshold matter, this view is
understandable. Characterizing someone as disabled sends the message that she
is entitled to resources, presumably based upon need. This may be offensive to an
individual who believes herself to be self-sufficient. Treating the inquiries
separately undercuts this concern. Under the proposed scheme, taking offense
would require an objection to the formal protections afforded the disabled as a
protected class, protections an individual need not invoke.'
26
2. Entitlement to Resources
Currently the Court does not separate Q2 from QI, though these are distinct
factual inquiries. 127 Applying the normal species functioning baseline to Q2:
Those who function in a species-typical fashion are not entitled to resources.
Conversely, those who function in a non-species-typical way (due to disease or
biological defect) may have claims to resources.
125. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002) (emphasis added).
126. Objections to membership in a protected class do not arise in other civil rights contexts,
such as race and gender. Obviously, however, in these contexts eligibility for protection does not
involve impaired capacities.
127. See supra Section IV.A.
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Resource claims are limited depending upon available public or private resources
as well as, under current judicial construction of the Act, the ability of an
individual to mitigate her disability. The defenses of undue burden and direct
threat also may affect claims to resources. While resource availability is
inherently a social constraint, it pertains not to entitlement to a remedy (or to the
alternative modes of finctioning model) but rather to the availability of a
remedy. Consideration of mitigating measures, though, does pertain to
entitlement to a remedy and invokes models of finctioning. The Court looks to
functional outcomes (the alternative modes of functioning model) when
considering mitigation rather than the manner of functioning to determine
entitlement to resources. Thus, under current law, when mitigating measures are
considered, an individual who does not function in a manner that is normal for
the species may have a lesser claim to resources because of an ability to function
effectively in an atypical manner.
Applying the normal species functioning model to resource claims without
considering mitigation allows resource distribution to those who function in
atypical ways. Applying the model to resource claims when mitigation is
considered, an individual may still be entitled to resources to promote her normal
opportunity range. This would likely be the case in instances of partial or difficult
mitigation of disability, situations involving those who are hyper-vulnerable to
changes in their environments, or circumstances where company policies label
workers as safety risks on the basis of disability, even though there is no or
limited risk after mitigation. Under current jurisprudence, the latter two
categories of individuals are not protected. In order to sue, hyper-vulnerable
individuals are forced to wait until changes in their environment render them
disabled. In its famous trilogy of cases, the Court finds the plaintiffs not disabled
after mitigation but unable to meet the safety requirements of their employers; it
is unclear, though, whether these safety precautions are reasonable or a source of
disability discrimination in themselves.
Under current judicial construction of the ADA, one could not adopt the
alternative modes of functioning model in response to Q2 without also adopting
it for at least one of the prongs of the statutory definition of disability
encompassed by Q1, as discussed above. This Article rejects the alternative
modes of functioning model at Q1.128 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that if one
were to adopt the alternative modes of functioning model for Q1 and Q2, the
same arguments about over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness would apply.
It is difficult to know where to draw lines, as a matter of justice as well as
practice, around a class of disabled individuals whose disabilities are believed to
be wholly or mostly a matter of social construction. Further, those individuals
128. See supra Subsection IV.B. I.
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who exert much effort to overcome impairments would encounter a significant
hurdle at the remedy stage if they appeared to be functioning effectively,
assuming they could even establish a "substantial" disability under Ql. This is a
much higher hurdle to establish disability than the one faced under the normal
species functioning approach, even taking into account mitigating measures.
One problem with looking to normal functioning in the context of remedy is
an individual who functions in an atypical manner is entitled to resources even if
she functions to the same level without resources as someone who functions in a
species-typical fashion. Arguably, this is in keeping with the spirit of the ADA,
which only seeks to protect individuals who are disabled under the statutory
definition of disability or who are discriminated against on the basis of being
regarded as disabled under this definition. Individuals disadvantaged for other
reasons were excluded by Congress. 129 It is important to remember that the civil
rights grounded in the ADA need not give rise to an accommodation. This is
recognized in the statutory definition of "qualified individual with a disability"
under Title I, which states that if an individual is disabled, she is qualified for
employment, so long as she can fulfill the essential functions of her job "with or
without reasonable accommodation." 
30
3. Nature ofAccommodation
Applying the normal species functioning baseline to Q3:
Resources must support species-typical ways of functioning. If the normal
species functioning baseline is not applied to Q3, disabled persons may be
accommodated in a manner that best supports preferred and more effective
modes of functioning, regardless of whether these modes of functioning are
normal for the species.
Legal, moral, and policy arguments support the conclusion that a person with a
disability should determine her own accommodation.
a. Essential Functions Test
As already discussed, the interactive process advocated by the EEOC
strongly supports, though does not require, that a disabled employee be able to
choose her own accommodation.' 31 In addition, Congress, courts, and the EEOC
have already embraced the idea of functional outcomes versus manner of
functioning in the essential functions context. The essential functions test of Title
129. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 5 1-52 (1990).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
131. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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I, which requires that a qualified individual with a disability be able to fulfill the
essential functions of her job "with or without reasonable accommodation," is
interpreted by the EEOC to mean that an employee must be able to obtain a
certain functional result.1 32 The clearest articulation of this view is found in the
EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual, which states that:
In identifying an essential function to determine if an individual with a
disability is qualified, the employer shouldfocus on the purpose of the function
and the result to be accomplished, rather than the manner in which the
function presently is performed. An individual with a disability may be
qualified to perform the function if an accommodation would enable this
person to perform the job in a different way, and the accommodation does not
impose an undue hardship. Although it may be essential that a function be
performed, frequently it is not essential that it be performed in a particular
133way.
Similarly, the Technical Assistance Manual states that formal job analysis to
identify the essential functions of a job must "take into account the fact that
people with disabilities often can perform essential functions using other skills
and abilities [than those specifically enumerated in the analysis]. ' l 4 It continues,
"[t]he job analysis may contain information on the manner in which a job
currently is performed, but should not conclude that ability to perform the job in
that manner is an essential function, unless there is no other way to perform the
function without causing undue hardship." 135 In making accommodations,
employers should focus upon ways in which an individual might fulfill an
essential job function rather than the manner in which they currently do so.
136
The Technical Assistance Manual provides three examples of atypical
functioning fulfilling essential functions: developing computer programs directly
on the computer rather than by hand, listening to audiotapes to learn technical
manuals rather than reading them, and using tools of assist to lift cartons into
truck-trailers rather than lifting them by hand.
1 37
The Congressional Record also supports the proposition that the essential
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
133. EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF
THE AMERICAN'S WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 2.3(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at § 2.3(b).
135. Id.
136. Id. at § 3.5 ("In considering an accommodation, the focus should be on the abilities and
limitations of the individual ... on ways that [a] person might be able to do the job function, not on
the nature of her disability or how persons with this kind of disability generally might be able to
perform the job.").
137. Id. at § 2.3(b).
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functions test is concerned with functional outcomes rather than the mode of
functioning. The distinction was made by Representative Fish when he
introduced amendments to the bill that became the ADA. He stated:
The essentialfunction requirement focuses on the desired result rather than the
means of accomplishing it. For example, in one case under the Rehabilitation
Act, the employer required each employee to be able to perform the job with
both arms. Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). The
plaintiff was unable to do this because his disability resulted in limited mobility
in his left arm. The court found that the essential function of the job was the
ability to lift and carry mail which the employee had proven that he could do,
not the ability to use both arms. Moreover, the court found that the employer
was required to adapt the work environment to determine whether the
employee with the disability could perform the essential requirements of the
job with reasonable adaptations.
Likewise, in a job requiring the use of a computer, the essential function is the
ability to access, input, and retrieve information from the computer. It is not
essential that the person be able to use the keyboard or visually read the
computer screen, if the provision of adaptive equipment or software would
enable the person with the disability-for example, impaired vision or limited
hand control-to control the computer and access the information. The relevant
question would be whether the acquisition of the equipment would be a
reasonable accommodation, given the factors to be considered in making that
determination. 1
38
This passage is cited by the Third Circuit in Skerski v. Time Warner Cable
Co., for a similar proposition, namely, that the requirement of a job detailing a
method of performance may not be an essential function if the task it targets may
be accomplished in an atypical way. 139 In addition, at least two other circuits
have acknowledged that accommodations for atypical functioning may allow an
individual to fulfill the essential functions of her job. In Gillon v. Fallon
Ambulance Services, the First Circuit found that a woman missing part of one
arm due to a genetic defect was able to serve as an emergency medical technician
138. 136 CONG. REC. 11,451 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (emphasis
added).
139. Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2001). In Skerski, a
cable installer technician who suffered anxiety attacks at high elevations requested the use of a
bucket truck to reach cable wires. The court remanded the case on the grounds that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether climbing was a physical task job requirement but not
an essential function, and, if so, whether the defendant's reassignment of Skerski to a warehouse
position was a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 280-86.
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with a partner to aid in lifting and carrying adults on stretchers. 140 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit, in Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota, & Eastern Railroad Co.,
acknowledged that a "long call" procedure of advance warning allowed a man
who lost his thumb and part of a finger and damaged his right arm to be an on-
call locomotive engineer by affording him sufficient time to report to work.
41
b. Philosophical Argument from Moral Equivalence
Particular philosophical perspectives also lend support for the argument that
accommodation to restore or promote normal species functioning should not be
given priority over accommodation of alternative modes of functioning. There is
a philosophical argument to be made about the moral equivalence between
"treatment" (that is, amelioration of a defect to normal functioning) and other
forms of compensation. If treatment to further normal species functioning is
morally equivalent to other forms of compensation that support alternative modes
of functioning, failing to provide compensation for these alternative forms of
functioning may be unjust.
The literature on the moral equivalence of treatment and prevention is of
some assistance in understanding the moral distinction between compensation,
via facilitating alternative modes of functioning, and treatment or prevention
offered to preserve normal species functioning. Treatment, after all, is not always
fully restorative and may be used as a form of compensation to support
alternative modes of functioning. In fact, treatments may be provided for the
purpose of producing only marginal benefits for individuals with disabling
conditions. There are, of course, limitations to this analogy, insofar as treatment
may bring one back to normal species functioning, and compensation is
understood to try to restore one to functionality in society, possibly outside of
what is normal for the species.
As part of the treatment/prevention debate, philosopher Paul Menzel argues
that treatment has a qualified moral priority over prevention.142 This is so, in part,
because rational people may choose to avoid the greatest risk to their life by
spending more in high-risk situations, that is, on treatment when they are sick,
than in low-risk situations, such as prevention when they are well. This priority is
140. 283 F.3d 11 (lst Cir. 2003).
141. 327 F.3d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 2003) (allowing Plaintiff time to "bathe, dress, shave, prepare a
meal, and drive himself to work on time").
142. PAUL T. MENZEL, MEDICAL COSTS, MORAL CHOICES: A PILOSOPHY OF HEALTH CARE
ECONOMICS IN AMERICA 151-83 (1983). Menzel is concerned with the emphasis of treatment over
prevention in the allocation of medical resources. His conclusion is useful to the present discussion
for understanding the priority of treatment (and by analogy compensation) relative to prevention of
deviation from normal species functioning.
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limited under a hypothetical choice situation, where individuals consider what is
fair at the beginning of their lives, as well as a willingness-to-pay argument in
circumstances where treatment is understood to make a less significant reduction
to the high risk. 143 Treatment may also be prioritized over prevention on the
ground that those who are currently sick (a case could be made for individuals
symptomatic as well as those asymptomatic for disabling disease or conditions)
would fail to benefit from prevention and therefore would not consent to the
moral equivalency between treatment and prevention. One exception to the
priority of treatment over prevention, as Menzel notes, is for situations where
prevention actually enables the subject's ability to consent to the moral
equivalence between treatment and prevention. 144 In other words, prevention
allows an individual the capacity to consent. In these cases, prevention should be
morally equivalent to treatment for the condition at stake.
45
Menzel's interpretation of the qualified moral priority of treatment over
prevention is of relevance to discussing compensation of altemative modes of
functioning versus prevention of deviation from normal species functioning. This
is so because an analogy may be made between treatment and compensation, as
compensation may be the outcome when treatment does not specifically reduce
high risk (though here the risk is to functioning and is not necessarily as
threatening).146  In these instances, prevention may have priority over
compensation, were it not for the fact that those with disabling diseases or
conditions are already affected. Given this factor, and with specific reference to
the neonatal context, Menzel argues that prevention and treatment in this context
are morally equivalent. He states:
[I]n assessing the importance of preventing congenital, chronically disabling
diseases for future persons . . . the claim for prevention is as weighty as the
claim for treatment of those in the present generation whom these disease
afflict, and in any case, it is weightier than the claim to prevent other, equally
cost-effective, preventable diseases which do not preclude their victims from
sometimes having a rational self-interest in a policy of equivalence. The
143. Id. at 171.
144. Id. at 175, 179. Menzel argues that this is a question of justice and not self-interest. He
compares it to a veto of moral priority when one is not sick, and argues that this veto is unjustified
because it is based upon self-interest, presumably because the individual would desire priority for
treatment if the tables were turned. It seems, however, that in both cases the parties are self-
interested, though perhaps for stronger reasons in the first (i.e., when the person is sick) than in the
second (i.e., when the individual is not yet sick). Regardless, a compelling interest may be enough
to sustain the qualification.
145. Id. at 178-79.
146. This may present difficulties for the analogy regarding some of the finer points of Menzel's
analysis, but the basic idea still stands.
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practical implications are immensely important. For example, treatment of
defective newborns may properly take priority over many types of prevention,
but it should not take priority over prevention of future, similar, neonatal
defects. An appeal to a local health-planning council to expand a neonatal
intensive-care unit, for example, should not be granted until equal-marginal-
benefit-producing funds are devoted to educational programs to prevent future
birth defects.147
This has several implications for the analogy between treatment/prevention
in the health care context and compensation/prevention for alternative modes of
functioning in the disability context. If, to continue Menzel's example, the fetus
is understood to have moral status, there are obvious limits to drawing an analogy
between educational programs to prevent future birth defects, with respect to
such practices as smoking and drinking during pregnancy, and preventing birth
defects through prenatal testing and selective abortion. If the fetus does not
possess moral status, however, one could argue that there is no morally relevant
difference between prevention and compensation with respect to discrimination
against the disabled. In this instance of moral equivalency, it seems that both
treatment of disabled newborns as well as prevention of disabled births would be
supported, so the claim to prenatal testing and selective abortion has equal force
to the claim to material supports to raise disabled children. 148
Making an analogy to Menzel's thesis in this manner, one could extend the
moral equivalency argument to compensation for disabilities outside of the
prenatal and neonatal context. This approach might lend support for funding for
compensatory medical care that seeks to support alternative modes of
functioning, rather than prioritizing accommodation that strives to normalize
individuals by preventing deviations from normal species functioning. Ceteris
paribus, extending the argument from moral equivalency in this manner lends
tremendous weight to the voices of disabled individuals who prefer non-species-
typical modes of functioning. The discussion now turns briefly to other theories
of distributive justice that support distributing resources to facilitate non-species-
typical modes of functioning.
147. MENZEL, supra note 142, at 177-78 (emphasis omitted).
148. If this analogy holds, there is no relevant moral difference between bringing an affected
fetus or the "next child" (the next, hypothetical child, non-rigidly defined) to term. Although
Menzel does not adopt the theory that Rawls presents in A Theory of Justice, supra note 55, if one
was to apply this argument to Rawls, this would assume that the original contractors know of their
existence and would not give treatment moral priority over prevention in an effort to preserve
themselves. Further discussion of this point, however, is outside of the scope of this Article.
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c. Additional Arguments from Justice
The dominant theories of just distribution, Ralwsian contractarianism (from
which Daniels's theory of normal species functioning is derived) and
consequentialist schemes, also provide some support for distributing resources to
aid alternative modes of functioning. Stated very generally, Rawls is concerned
with just procedure of distribution (pure procedural justice), and
consequentialists are concerned with best outcomes. The arguments are only very
superficially surveyed here.
To begin, the notion of hypothetical consent used by Menzel could be
applied to choice behind Rawls's veil of ignorance, where individuals do not
know their lot in life. In general, however, accommodating alternative modes of
functioning under Rawlsian contractarianism is more difficult than under
consequentialist schemes. This is because it is unclear what the difference
principle, the conception that resources should be distributed to benefit the least
advantaged, provides for individuals with disabilities. 149 In addition, Rawls's
discussion of primary goods, the basic social goods that are distributed, takes
little note of the diversity of needs between individuals.1 50 Since Rawls places
emphasis on normal functioning by assuming that individuals are normal and
fully functioning over a lifetime, an extension of his principles to a theory of the
just distribution of health care services would likely use normal functioning as a
baseline, as does Daniels's theory.' 51 Further, as recognized by Ronald Dworkin,
Robert Nozick, and Thomas Nagel, there is a social conscription of natural assets
149. As recognized by philosophically-minded Harvard economist Amartya Sen, "hard cases do
exist, and to take disabilities, or special health needs, or physical or mental defects, as morally
irreleant [sic], or to leave them out for fear of making a mistake, may guarantee that the opposite
mistake will be made." Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in CHOICE, WELFARE, AND
MEASUREMENT 353, 366 (1982).
150. RAWLS, supra note 55, at 440-46. Primary goods include the social bases of self-respect,
rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, and income and wealth. These goods are considered
primary because they are necessary for the fulfillment of all rational life plans. They avoid
commitment to specific ways of life that a "thick theory of the good" would entail, and, as a result,
are understood to represent Rawls's "thin theory of the good." Rawls's contractors seek to
maximize the amounts of primary goods available to citizens, though the concern is with pure
procedural justice rather than just outcomes.
151. See John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159,
168 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (Individuals are "normally active and fully
cooperating members of society over a complete life"). Nevertheless, it might be possible to extend
Rawls's principles and adopt a baseline of functional output that is blind to one's mode of
functioning.
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in Rawls in the sense that natural assets are treated as if they belong to society.
152
As a result, Rawls's theory leans toward a common mode of functioning, such
that natural assets can be measured across society. This makes it more difficult to
accommodate non-species-typical modes of functioning, though Rawlsian
contractarianism provides some support for atypical functioning, as is evident
through Daniels's conditional extension of the fair equality of opportunity
principle, encompassing the distribution of health care resources to compensate
individuals who cannot be brought back to normal functioning.
Consequentialist theory offers direct consideration of alternative modes of
functioning, although the distribution of resources for such purposes meets other
constraints. Consider the theory of basic capability equality proffered by
Amartya Sen.1 53 Stated very generally, Sen argues that "units" called capabilities
are to be maximized across populations. These units comprise sets (capability
sets) that reflect the actual functionings available to an individual. Pertinent to
present purposes, this means that capability sets are defined relative to a person's
ability (or disability). In other words, capabilities for functioning of that
individual are accounted for directly. A person may choose to maximize her
well-being by choosing a capability set with a particular level of functioning. It is
possible that this level of functioning could be achieved by mechanisms normal
for the species as well as those that fall outside of normal species functioning. If
other individuals in that society value the same level of functioning, it may be
equalized across the population considered, though there may be various means
of attaining it.
Similarly, any mode of functioning that contributes to utility will be valued
under a utilitarian consequentialist scheme, regardless of whether it is normal for
the species. Utilitarianism, the theory of the greatest good for the greatest
number, does meet some challenges in considering alternative modes of
152. Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183-231 (1974); Ronald Dworkin, The
Original Position, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 16-53
(Norman Daniels ed., 1989); Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL
STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, at 1-16.
153. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999); AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-being, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 30-53 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAW: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 138 (Sterling
M. McMurrin ed., 1987 [hereinafter Sen, Equality of What?]; Amartya Sen, On the Foundations of
Welfare Economics: Utility, Capability and Practical Reason, in ETHICS, RATIONALITY AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 50 (Francesco Farina et al. eds., 1996); Amartya Sen, The Standard of
Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques and The Standard of Living: Lecture I Lives and
Capabilities, in THE STANDARD OF LIVING (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 1987); Amartya Sen, Well-
being, Agency, and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 169 (1985).
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functioning but is not undermined in this regard. For utilitarianism, there is a
classic pure distribution problem. The disabled, who experience high satisfaction
in their lives despite their disability, have weaker claims than those individuals
without disabilities who live unhappy lives. This assumes, though, that
accommodation addressing disability fails to increase sufficiently the happiness
of the "happy disabled" to justify entitlement, but resources increase sufficiently
the happiness of the "unhappy able-bodied" for this purpose, which may not be
the case. 154
Another commonly invoked argument against utilitarian or cost-utility
approaches is that they create a situation of "double jeopardy" for individuals
who develop serious illness or disability.155 It is viewed as double jeopardy in the
sense that these individuals, often through "brute luck,"'156 experience illness or
disability and then subsequently have a lesser claim to resources as a result of
those conditions. What this position reveals, though, is the tension between
looking at distributive justice over a lifetime, as opposed to viewing it during
certain periods of time.157 If the premise of justice over a lifetime is accepted, this
form of double jeopardy does not constitute unjust treatment. The sick or
disabled are offered an equal chance for treatment or resources over a lifetime.'
58
In sum, there seem to be strong normative reasons for considering alternative
modes of functioning when compensating persons with disabilities. These
justifications are derivative of dominant theories of distributive justice, with
consequentialist frameworks offering the strongest support. As discussed in
Subsection IV.3.b, justification may also be derived from the moral equivalency
thesis of treatment and prevention. To fail to consider alternative modes of
functioning emphasizes manner of functioning rather than functional outcomes
and may reject valuable and preferred modes of functioning for persons with
disabilities.
154. Sen, Equality of What?, supra note 153, at 365. 1 am unable within the confines of this
Article to address all of the possible defenses that a utilitarian may have to such a standard critique.
See J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
155. JOHN MCKIE ET AL., THE ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: AN ETHICAL
EVALUATION OF THE "QALY" APPROACH 99-116 (1998).
156. "Brute luck" refers to risks that are not the product of "deliberate" choice, such as one's
genetic composition or disabling condition or illness (assuming that one did not deliberately choose
to place oneself in peril). Ronald Dworkin, Equality of Resources, in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 73-74 (2000).
157. MCKIE ET AL., supra note 155, at 99-116.
158. This may not adequately address the situation of individuals born with serious disabilities
or illnesses. Some cost-utility measurements, such as Quality Adjusted Life Years, however, take
into account the length of remaining life in determining entitlement to resources and may mitigate
this problem for individuals who experience long-term disability.
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4. Alternative Modes of Functioning and Accommodation Revisited
There are a number of reasons it may be important to account for the social
element of disability, or alternative functioning, in making accommodations.
First, the alternative modes of functioning model supports non-species-typical
modes of functioning that may allow disabled persons to function in a manner
that is preferred and more efficient. At a minimum, the alternative modes of
functioning model would stress an interactive process between an employer and
employee that considers non-species-typical accommodation. At a maximum, it
would require the employer to provide preferred, non-species-typical
accommodation, so long as it is reasonable and does not create an undue hardship
or direct threat under the terms of the ADA. Recent work in the area of
accommodation suggests both that accommodations are economically efficient
and that supporting alternative modes of functioning is not more costly than
supporting normal modes of functioning.
159
The alternative model of accommodation would also provide greater
protection to individuals with biological defects who currently function well in
society or at work but may be highly susceptible to changes in their
environments. A diabetic's hidden disability may require a certain work schedule
that allows for regular blood sugar tests and insulin as well as the ability to keep
food and insulin in the workplace and eat meals at regular times. 160 A shift in
workplace or a new schedule imposed by a management change could easily
disrupt the ability of the worker to control her diabetes. 16' Failing to consider the
social aspects of disability places such individuals on the brink of functional
impairment by requiring them to wait for a workplace change in order to have
their interests considered. 162 A person with such hyper-sensitivities may not, if
forced to sue, be entitled to disability protection under current judicial
construction of the ADA, since her condition may be self-controlled in certain
environments. The alternative modes of functioning model as applied to
accommodation would encourage a dialogue between individuals and employers
before environmental changes, in hopes of avoiding later conflicts,
accommodation requests after expenditures to alter environments, or litigation.
159. Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE
L.J. 79 (2003).
160. Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context of
Antidiscrimination Law, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 68, at 134.
161. Id. at 134-35.
162. As Silvers aptly states, "[pleople whose impairments make them extraordinarily vulnerable
to being made dysfunctional by seemingly innocuous alterations in their environments are
substantially limited simply in virtue of their hypervulnerability." Id. at 135.
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By advocating an alternative modes of functioning model for the
accommodation stage of disability analysis, focus is placed on functional
outcomes rather than modes of functioning. As discussed with regard to the
health status index in Section If.C, there are some health policy models that
purport to look to functional outcomes. These models often confuse manner of
functioning with functional outcomes, however.'
63
CONCLUSION
This Article examines a discrete part of the problem with American
disability law today. It argues that the Supreme Court's failure to consider
properly the role of normal species functioning has severely enervated
protections for the disabled and frustrated the purpose of the ADA. Part of the
trouble is attributable to the Court confusing three distinct levels of disability
analysis: eligibility for disability protections, entitlement to resources, and the
nature of accommodation. This Article proposes a three-part disability analysis
distinguishing these considerations that allows one to consider, with regard to
each inquiry, the role of normal species functioning. Philosophical works about
the normal species functioning and alternative modes of functioning models help
clarify the application of normal species functioning to these three inquiries and
established Supreme Court tests.
Proper consideration of normal species functioning leads to what this Article
terms Functioning-Based Disability Analysis. There is philosophical and legal
support for the application of the normal species functioning baseline to all three
163. Other relevant health indexes include the Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) approach,
which assesses overall quality of well-being not merely functionality, and the International
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF), which seeks to weigh the physical and
social aspects of disability as distinguished from handicap and impairment. See WHO, WORLD
HEALTH REPORT 2003: SHAPING THE FUTURE (2003); WHO, TOWARDS A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR
FUNCTIONING, DISABILITY, AND HEALTH (2002), available at http://www3.who.int/icf/beginners.htm
(defining "impairment" and "handicap" in a manner that embraces a social model); see also Dan
Wikler & Richard Cash, Ethical Issues in Global Public Health, in GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: A
NEW ERA 226 (Robert Beaglehole ed., 2003). The latter holds promise as a means for
conceptualizing disability and disability accommodations, though its vague definitions of key
concepts and myriad of classifications do not provide the flexibility of the ADA's disability
threshold test or hold promise for judicial economy. See Rob Imrie, Demystifying Disability: A
Review of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health, 26 SOC. OF
HEALTH & ILLNESS 287 (2004); Teresa Magalhaes & Claude Hamonet, Handicap Assessment:
Setting the Grounds for an Ejfective Intervention, 20 MED. & L. 153, 153-59 (2001); see also
WHO, ICF Checklist, available at http://www3.who.int/icf/checklist/icf-checklist.pdf (last visited
Sept. 5, 2005) (providing a fifteen page abbreviated checklist for assessing the functioning of an
individual).
45
Satz: A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
levels of the disability threshold inquiry. There is similar support for the
application of the normal species functioning baseline to the question of
entitlement to resources. When determining the nature of remedy, or
accommodation, however, the normal species functioning model fails to consider
more efficient, alternative methods of functioning that may not be typical for our
species. A strong case can be made that the disabled should be able to choose the
nature of their accommodation as a matter of justice. Regulations and case law
from the essential functions context provide additional support.
This Article examines the elements of disability analysis at its most concrete
level and the role of normal functioning at a more abstract level. It is necessary to
move between these two levels of abstraction to locate exactly what is wrong
with American disability law today. As current Supreme Court jurisprudence
indicates, it is extremely difficult to assess the role of normal species functioning
when the levels of disability analysis are conflated. Similarly, it is not possible to
answer the questions raised at each level of analysis without direct consideration
of whether it is relevant that some individuals function effectively in a manner
that is different from most of our species.
This understanding of disability analysis and functioning is an integral part
of disability law reform. Only after understanding the levels of disability inquiry
and the role of functioning as applied to each is it possible to see resolution to the
over-arching tension between the civil rights and social welfare models of
disability law. This takes one to yet a higher, though vital level of abstraction, to
which this Article ultimately speaks.
The relevance of functioning to each level of disability analysis casts light
on whether disability law should embrace a civil rights or social welfare model.
Normative and legal claims support applying normal species functioning to the
questions of whether an individual is disabled and entitled to a remedy. Applying
the normal species functioning model in this way supports the civil rights model
of disability law. The normal species functioning model furthers, as a matter of
justice, an individual's normal opportunity range. This promotes equality of
participation in civil society for a protected class of persons, namely, those who
do not function in a manner that is normal for our species.
When it comes to allowing a disabled individual to determine the nature of
the accommodation that would be most effective for her, the normal species
functioning model, the civil rights model, and the law as it stands, stop short. The
civil rights model is silent on manner of functioning, so long as equality of
participation is promoted. Under this model, like the normal species functioning
model, a firm need not support alternative modes of functioning. Arguments
from particular philosophical perspectives and law support the alternative modes
of functioning model for determining the nature of accommodation. The
alternative modes of functioning model, which is a social model, looks to
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functional outcomes within certain environments as opposed to the manner of
functioning. Similarly, a social welfare model has the flexibility to redistribute
resources to those most in need with functional impairments, regardless of
manner of functioning. Thus, while the civil rights model gives broad rights to
the disabled in a variety of contexts, the social welfare model responds to certain
kinds of functioning disadvantages, creating an entitlement to resources that may
support alternative modes of functioning. Hannah should be able to use her
fleshy feet.
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